

***Cosmopolitans, Nationalists and Parochials:
Globalization and Cultural Change***

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Abstract:

Many claim that the most recent wave of globalization has increased the interconnectedness between people, companies and governments worldwide. But has it transformed popular culture so that more people have come to see themselves as global citizens rather than, say, Americans, Russians or British, or, at a more local level, as Bostonians, Muscovites, or Londoners? This paper provides a preliminary exploration of the cultural impact of globalization.

Three issues are raised for discussion: will cultural cosmopolitanism eventually come to supersede national or parochial identities? Is cosmopolitanism more prevalent, as one might expect, in post-industrial societies, among the younger generation and among the well-educated and more affluent sectors of society? And what are some of the implications of cultural cosmopolitanism? Drawing on the 1995 ISSP survey of national identity, the paper provides a preliminary look at some of the evidence in 23 nations.

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"If my theory of relativity is proven correct, Germany will claim me as a German and France will declare that I am a citizen of the world. Should my theory prove untrue, France will say that I am a German and Germany will declare that I am a Jew."

Albert Einstein, Address to the Sorbonne, 1930

Globalization is understood to refer to the expansion in the scale and speed of flows of capital, goods, people and ideas across borders with the effect of decreasing the effects of distance. Indicators commonly used to monitor this phenomenon include levels of international trade, communication, or migration¹.

One way to think about the cultural impact of globalization is to draw a broad distinction between cosmopolitans, nationalists and parochials². *Cosmopolitans* can be understood as essentially 'citizens of the world' with a broad internationalist outlook, for example equally comfortable living and working in different countries, familiar with travel well beyond their national and regional boundaries, and fluent in languages. It is commonly assumed that cosmopolitanism is most common among a privileged international elite, the Geneva-educated and Ivy-leagued sons and daughters of diplomats, bankers and generals, equally at home in financial houses, embassy receptions and platinum-card airport lounges from New York to Riyadh and Kuala Lumpur. The logic of periodic waves of globalization should have expanded the pool of world citizens, whether driven by the world ambitions of the Roman Empire, the *lingua franca* of Latin and the bonds of medieval Christianity uniting the Holy Roman Empire, the Grand Tour and Enlightenment philosophy of the 18th Century Europe, the expansion of free trade and empire riding the rails of the industrial revolution among the great powers in the late Victorian era, or the global market economy of the Post-Cold War era. Many pressures in the late twentieth century should have encouraged a resurgence of cosmopolitanism beyond elite circles³. In terms of communication, alone, for those with access, as we all know it is easier, faster and cheaper than ever before to email, phone or fax people around the world, to surf front-pages or broadband news programs from Australia to Zimbabwe, and to break down the national barriers of the national news media⁴. In Brunn and Leinbach's phrase, new communications technology has the potential effect of collapsing space and time⁵.

Yet, rather than an inexorable secular trend, globalization may experience internal tensions and periodic reverse waves. In Anthony Smith's view⁶: "We are still far from even mapping out the kind of global culture and cosmopolitan ideals that can truly supercede the world of nations." *Nationalists* are understood as those who identify strongly with the nation-state, with high levels of national pride, who emphasize the importance of distinct ethno-nationalistic identities and cultural and economic protectionism. National identities are usually implicit and inert, and may only rise to the surface in response to an 'other', in which (rather like Simon de Beauvoir's *Second Sex*) we know what we are by virtue of what we are not. Even though the idea of national identity is widely employed, it tends to be fuzzy, complex and under-conceptualized⁷.

Lastly, *parochials* are understood as those who celebrate the idiosyncrasies of diverse local and regional cultures, foods and traditions, who prefer all politics to be devolved to sub-national levels, and who stress the importance of dense communities with clearly defined territorial and

social boundaries demarcating who does and does not belong, based on particular neighborhoods, regions, or ethnic/religious identities.

In intellectual and cultural circles, although there are conflicting tugs, cosmopolitanism is usually widely regarded as a highly desirable ideal, whereas parochialism is commonly assumed to be narrow, provincial and retrograde. As a natural globalist, with shallow local roots, stranded culturally somewhere in the mid-Atlantic, suspicious of nationalism and yet constantly aware of it, I tend to sympathize with this view. Yet both nationalism and parochialism receive legitimacy from the belief that the apparently universal 'global' culture carries the risks of standardization and the impoverishment of local cultures, if today the global is actually a predominately American consumer culture (a.k.a. MacWorld). This belief justifies barriers to the free flow of goods (import taxes), people (immigrants) or culture (such as non-domestic films).

Popular resistance to globalization is widely evident in terms of deep-rooted ethnic conflict and a resurgence of nationalist movements, evident from East Timor to Kosovo and the Palestine, as well as more peaceful devolution to regional and local levels of governance, as in Scotland. Even within the European Union, the ambitious attempt to create a single economic and monetary market (EMU) transcending national boundaries, symbolized by the notes and coins of the euro, is believed by Euroskeptics to be a grand folly that will ultimately prove unable to cope with the major disjunctures in economies as diverse as Portugal, Germany and Sweden, let alone, in future, Poland, Hungary and Romania. Given this understanding, is there any evidence of an emerging cosmopolitan identity that may threaten and supersede traditional national and parochial identities and, if so, how do we start to explain this phenomenon?

Hypotheses and Data

An initial look at some evidence is available from the survey on national identity conducted in 1995 by the International Social Survey Program among 26 established and newer democracies (N. 28,270) ⁸. We can all think of many factors that could influence the strength of territorial identities. Cosmopolitanism could plausibly be associated with cultural and regional linkages like common languages, physical proximity and religious ties; historical traditions (such as Japanese isolationism and Swiss internationalism); exposure to traditional and new communication technologies; patterns of migration (such as in Israel); and a country's relative political, economic and military power on the world stage. From this complex array, a few simple factors were selected for further consideration.

Aggregate Level Hypotheses

First, if *socioeconomic development* is the modern driving force behind cultural cosmopolitanism we expected this phenomenon to be most evident in advanced post-industrial societies like the United States, Sweden and the UK. The reason is that these countries are among those which have been transformed most radically by the process of technological change, new communications, and the free transfer of good and services, as well as by high levels of education and affluence produced by socioeconomic development. In contrast we expected that both nationalism and parochialism would remain stronger in less developed economies such as those in Asia and in Central and Eastern Europe.

If *political* factors are driving cultural cosmopolitanism, we would expect this phenomenon to be more evident in European Union member states than in other post-industrial societies. The Community is the most ambitious

attempt at trans-national cooperation and integration. The 1992 Single European Act aimed to eliminate physical, technical and fiscal frontiers between member states, to reduce regional inequalities, to harmonize rules governing working conditions, to strengthen research and development, to protect the environment, and to facilitate monetary cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1996, strengthens political as well as economic union, including common foreign and security policies. Economic and monetary union took a major step forward in January 1999 with the launching of the euro on the world currency market. If the process of European integration has influenced national identities we would expect to find stronger feelings of attachment to 'Europe' in EU member states like Germany than in countries like Norway.

Individual-Level Hypotheses

Alternatively if the latest wave of globalism is a cyclical trend then plausibly the process of *generational* change may be influencing cosmopolitanism. If this is the case then we should find that older citizens remain more strongly parochial or nationalistic in their identification, while younger generations, backpacking with Eurail passes, volunteering for the peace corps, or working with environmental NGOs around the world, would be more cosmopolitan in their orientation.

Lastly, there are the 'usual suspects' at individual-level including *social background* variables (socioeconomic status, education and gender), as well as a few less obvious *experiential* variables (whether a person has lived abroad, their language skills, and their parent's citizenship), and *attitudinal* variables (such as national pride, cultural and economic protectionism, and attitudes towards immigrants). The logic suggests that after the aggregate controls the variables should be entered in this order in any modeling process.

The distinction between cosmopolitanism, nationalism and parochialism can be gauged most simply by the strength of people's attachment to different territorial areas. People were asked to use 4-point scales to show how close they felt to their neighborhood (understood to indicate the strength of parochialism⁹), country (nationalism) or continent (cosmopolitanism). As we shall see, there are serious questions about whether these measures tap the dimensions at the heart of our paper, and further research would examine alternative measures of cosmopolitanism as well, but the exploratory results provide some initial insights into the nature of territorial identities.

Explaining Territorial Identities

Table 1 describes the broad distribution of our dependent variables in twenty-three nations, grouped by major region. The most striking finding is that far more people continue to identify with their nation (87%) and their neighborhood (74%), rather than their continent (58%). Nevertheless the majority of the public do have some sense of a supra-national identity, feeling at least at some diffuse level close to 'Europe' or 'Asia' or 'North America'.

[Table 1 about here]

To see whether these patterns hold with alternative measures Table 2 examines whether people were willing to move to another neighborhood, country or continent to improve their work or living conditions. The results of this indicator show a drastic shrinkage in the proportion of 'cosmopolitans'; only

15% proved willing to move to another continent under these conditions. Indeed far from a global free market of labor, most people were strongly rooted in their area; only one fifth would be willing to transfer abroad and under half would be willing to move to another neighborhood. Broad issues of national identity clearly provoke a different response to the practical question of job mobility.

[Table 2 about here]

Socio-economic development

Regression models were run to predict how close people felt to their neighborhood, nation and continent. The first hypothesis suggests that socioeconomic development is one of the core factors behind cosmopolitanism. This factor was operationalized from World Bank data as per capita 1997 GDP standardized at purchasing power parity. The models show that levels of economic development proved significant across all models, but in the cosmopolitan model the pattern was in the reverse direction to that expected. In other words, less developed societies were more parochial and nationalistic, true, but they were also more likely to identify with their continent. This was particularly the case for countries like Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic, who felt strongly European. Perhaps the experience of the ex-Warsaw Pact countries under the Soviet Union may heighten their desire to be associated with affluent Western Europe rather than countries to their East.

Rather than understanding these identities as trade offs, where people can be classified as either parochial or cosmopolitan, it may be that territorial identities are overlapping and multiple. This understanding implies that the key distinction may be between those who feel any territorial rootedness, at whatever level, and the rolling stones who feel more transient and global. If we glance down the proportion who feel close to their neighborhood in Table 1 it is apparent that parochialism is strongest in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Bulgaria, one of the poorest and least developed societies under comparison. Yet Bulgarians also has a strong sense of attachment to their country and to Europe.

Political Explanations

The role of the EU in encouraging supra-national identities received no confirmation from this comparison. Citizens who lived in the European Union had a relatively strong sense of local and national identity, but this failed to predict a sense of European identity. As shown in Table 1 the degree of cosmopolitanism, gauged by the measure of closeness to the respondent's continent, varied substantially between countries¹⁰. For example, while two-thirds of Italians and over half the Germans and Dutch felt close to 'Europe', this was true of only one third of the Swedes and one fifth of the Brits. A similar pattern is found in many other indicators of identification with Europe in successive Eurobarometer surveys, with the late-joiners to the EU far less enthusiastic members than the founding EU-6¹¹.

Moreover most countries of Central and Eastern Europe felt more strongly 'European' than EU member states, and the EU average was no greater than in any other major region. It appears that by this measure, if adequate to gauge 'cosmopolitanism', (and it is a real 'if'), membership of the EU does not contribute towards supranational identities.

Social Background and Personal Experiences

Among the social background variables, contrary to the generational theory, age is consistently associated with a stronger territorial

identification across all three levels. This suggests that as people age they become more attached to their neighborhood and country, as expected when people put down roots in an area, perhaps buying a home, starting a family, and settling into a local job. But at the same time older people are also more likely to identify with their continent.

Education is associated with weaker territorial identities across all levels, but particularly the local one. The more educated the person, the less they feel attached to a particular area. Women are also slightly more likely than men to have a sense of territorial roots across all three levels.

Two social indicators do behave in the predicted direction, reversing by level. The level of urbanization is a strong predictor of parochialism, with a greater sense of local place in rural areas. But where someone lives becomes insignificant in terms of attachments to their continent. And household income shows that the less affluent are more likely to fall into the category of parochials while those who are better off are more likely to feel a sense of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, income proved the strongest demographic indicator of cosmopolitanism, perhaps confirming the elite profile that we mentioned earlier. Cosmopolitanism remains strongest among the higher social strata.

Some of the experiential indicators proved interesting and better behaved. The length of residency in a community proved by far the strongest predictor of parochialism, outweighing even GNP. And how long someone had lived abroad and their ability speak more than one language was associated with cosmopolitanism. In contrast none of the indicators of personal or parental citizenship proved significant.

Attitudes

Lastly, in terms of attitudes, national pride was a strong predictor of territorial attachments at every level; people who felt a sense of pride in their country's scientific, artistic and sporting achievements, and their political system or history, were more likely to identify with their neighborhood, country and continent. Positive attitudes towards immigrants, such as willingness to take in refugees, were also positively associated with cosmopolitanism and negatively linked to nationalism. Other attitudinal indicators tended to be weak or mixed¹².

The Growth of Cosmopolitanism?

Based on this preliminary glance at some of the indicators we can conclude that while there is considerable evidence to study global trends in the free flow of goods, services, capital, people, ideas and force, we know far less about the cultural consequences of these developments. Has globalization produced increased numbers of cosmopolitans, citizens of the world who feel comfortable traveling, living and working within different societies, or in reaction has there been a resurgence of nationalism, or even parochialism? Growing cultural globalism is often assumed but, beyond aggregate figures, such as trends in news flows, movie receipts or the number of MacDonalds around the world, we know little about what it means for our sense of identity, attachment and citizenship.

The initial exploration of the comparative data suggests the following pattern. Parochialism, defined as a sense of attachment to the local neighborhood, is most strongly associated with how long people have lived in an area, and it is commonly stronger among those who live in rural areas, older generations, the less educated, women, and those of lower economic

status. It is linked to feelings of national pride, and most often found in less developed countries. Nationalism, measured by feeling close to one's country, displays a fairly similar profile. Again nationalism is stronger among less developed societies, the older generations, the less educated, women, and among those with high levels of national pride, as well as anti-immigrant attitudes. These patterns are largely in line with expectations from the literature.

Cosmopolitanism, defined as a sense of attachment to a person's continent, is less satisfactorily explained here. Indeed in many respects (although not all) the profile of cosmopolitans is not that dissimilar to the above patterns. Contrary to expectations, cosmopolitans were also found to be stronger in less developed countries, among the older generation, among the less educated and among those with a sense of national pride. The only stronger and more distinctive indicators concern the fact that cosmopolitans were drawn disproportionately from the more affluent strata, they were more likely to have language skills and to have lived abroad (part of the key aspects of cosmopolitanism discussed earlier), and they were more liberal towards issues of immigration. Overall, however, this pattern needs further analysis before we can be more comfortable with the results¹³. Two reasons, in particular, may help explain this somewhat muddy profile.

Perhaps one major limitation or flaw in this analysis concerns the measurement of cosmopolitanism, which is a complex concept. As McCrone and Surridge remark¹⁴, "National identity is one of the most discussed but least understood concepts of the late 20th century." The idea of nationalism is subtle, elusive and contained many fragmented qualities bundled under one heading. The measures which we have been using probably fail to capture the many complexities involved in gauging cosmopolitanism too, in part because feelings of national and cosmopolitan identity may prove highly contextual and conditional, dependent upon the 'other' as much as the self. In Scotland, I feel English. In the United States, I feel European. In Europe, I feel American. In India or Indonesia or Korea, I feel 'Western'. In many contexts, I feel confused!

On the other hand, if we accept the operationalization of the concepts, the preliminary analysis presented here may lead us to question the common assumption of a trade-off between attachments to the locality and nation state, on the one hand, and a broader sense of supra-national identities, on the other. Our territorial identities may be multiple rather than a zero-sum game. We need to go much further to unravel, clarify and measure the concept of cosmopolitanism, and to distinguish the impact of globalism on cultural identities in general, and our feelings of cosmopolitanism, nationalism and parochialism in particular.

Table 1. Feelings of Attachment to Different Areas

(%) Feel Close	Neighborhood	Country	Continent	
North America		63	78	57
	Canada	69	75	56
	US	57	81	59
Western Europe		71	86	54
	Germany, W	73	79	58
	Ireland	84	93	44
	Italy	68	88	69
	Netherlands	71	87	54
	Norway	51	94	58
	Spain	88	90	62
	Sweden	65	83	37
	UK	64	71	21
C. & Eastern Europe		77	90	66
	Bulgaria	88	93	87
	Czech Rep	81	92	81
	Germany, E	76	79	59
	Hungary	80	96	94
	Latvia	68	86	35
	Poland	74	94	71
	Russia	67	82	19
	Slovakia	84	89	81
	Slovenia	77	93	69
Asia & Pacific		82	94	55
	Australia	83	91	69
	Japan	91	95	76
	New Zealand	65	94	54
	Philippines	74	94	71
ALL		74	87	58

Note: Q. "How close do you feel to:...your neighborhood...[your nation]...[Europe,etc]" (5-point scale) N.27628.

Source: International Social Science Program (ISSP) 1995 survey on National Identity. (ZA 2880)




Table 2. Willingness to move to Different Areas

(%) Willing to move to another	Neighborhood	Country	Continent
North America		68	20
	Canada	67	25
	US	70	15
Western Europe		53	17
	Germany, W	60	16
	Ireland	39	14
	Italy	54	16
	Netherlands	61	20
	Norway	55	15
	Spain	48	19
	Sweden	53	23
	UK	58	22
C. & Eastern Europe		33	12
	Bulgaria	34	19
	Czech Rep	43	8
	Germany, E	51	9
	Hungary	28	5
	Latvia	20	8
	Poland	39	15
	Russia	17	N/a
	Slovakia	48	16
	Slovenia	35	8
Asia & Pacific		39	15
	Australia	36	8
	Japan	26	7
	New Zealand	56	19
	Philippines	37	22
ALL		46	15

Note: Q. "If you could improve your work or living conditions how willing or unwilling would you be to move to another neighborhood,.. move outside your country...move outside [Europe, etc.]" N.27628. **Source:** International Social Science Program (ISSP) 1995 survey on National Identity. (ZA 2880)




Table 3: Predictors of Parochialism, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism

Independent variables	Parochialism "Feel close to neighborhood"	Nationalism "Feel close to country"	Cosmopolitanism "Feel close to continent"	Coding
National controls				
Level of Development	-.17	-.30	-.23	Per capita
EU Member state	.09	.13	.01	EU Member (
Social Background				
Age	.06	.15	.09	Years
Education	-.07	-.03	-.03	Scale from
Gender: Male	-.03	-.04	-.02	Male (1)/Fe
Community size	.09	-.03	-.01	Urban (1),
HH Income	-.09	.05	.10	Household i
Experiences				
Lived abroad	-.01	-.01	.04	Never (1) 1 (3) 5+ (4)
How long lived in current town	.21	-.02	-.01	Scale
Citizen of country	.01	-.01	-.01	Yes (1)/No
Parents citizens of country	.01	-.02	-.01	Both parent
Language skills	.05	.01	.16	Speak more
Attitudes				
National pride	.12	.30	.16	11-item sca
Economic protectionism	-.04	-.01	-.06	3 item scal
Cultural protectionism	.03	-.03	.01	3 item scal
Attitudes towards immigration	.05	-.05	.12	6 item scal
Left-right party support	-.03	.01	.03	Scaled fron
Constant	2.25	2.93	1.6	
Adjusted R2	.14	.13	.08	

Note: The dependent variables are the feelings of attachment to the neighborhood, c shown in Table 1. The coefficients represent standardized beta coefficients in or regression models. Coefficients in **bold** are significant at <.05 or above.

Source: International Social Science Program (ISSP) 1995 survey on National Identity. (

¹ Dani Rodrik. 1997. *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?*; David Held. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*.

² For a more detailed discussion of this distinction see Pippa Norris. 1997. '**Towards A More Cosmopolitan Political Science?**' *European Journal of Political Research* Spring 30(1).

³ For a good discussion see Michael Featherstone. (ed). 1995. *Global Culture*. London: Sage.

⁴ For a new study of the pattern of political communications in post-industrial societies see Pippa Norris. (forthcoming Fall 2000) *Mediated Democracies: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies*. For an excellent summary of the literature on the global patterns of news flows see Hamid Mowlana. 1997. *Global Information and World Communication*. 2nd ed. London: Sage. For an overview of recent trends see Unesco. 1997. *World Communication Report: The Media and the Challenge of the New Technologies*. Paris: UNESCO

⁵ Brunn, S. and Leinbach, T.R. (eds). 1991. *Collapsing Space and Time: Geographic Aspects of Communication & Information*. London: HarperCollins Academic.

⁶ Anthony Smith. 1995. 'Towards a Global Culture?' In *Global Culture* edited by Michael Featherstone. London: Sage.

⁷ There is a large literature on the concepts of nationalism and national identity. See, for example, B. Anderson. 1996. *Imagined Communities: reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso; Michael Billig. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage; Ernest Gellner. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell. The most thorough empirical work on orientations within Europe from 1973-1990 can be found in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. 1995. *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For a new study of attitudes towards nationalism in Scotland and Wales see Bridget Taylor and Katarina Thomson. 1999. *Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?* Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

⁸ For other work based on this survey, comparing West and East Germany, Britain, Sweden and Spain see David McCrone and Paula Surridge. 1998. 'National Identity and National Pride.' In *British and European Social Attitudes, the 15th Report* edited by Roger Jowell et al. Aldershot: Ashgate. It should be noted that the codebook for all the variables in the ISSP survey is included as a technical appendix to this book.

⁹ It should be noted that the ISSP survey also asked respondents about their closeness to their 'town or city', and their 'county', but for ease of interpretation these results are not presented here since they proved similar to the responses to 'neighborhood'.

¹⁰ Although this could also be due to the wording of this item. The exact phrasing for non-European countries remains unclear from the available ISSP documentation.

¹¹ See Pippa Norris. (forthcoming Fall 2000) *Mediated Democracies: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies*.

¹² It should be noted that the models were run splitting the file into developing and developed nations. The results showed that the pattern of left-right attitudes reversed by sector, so that nationalism was associated with support for the left in Eastern Europe and support of the right in Western Europe. The full results are not reported here for reasons of limited space.

¹³ Some preliminary analysis was run using the attitudinal indicators in the survey as an alternative measure of cosmopolitanism and this strategy will be pursued further in any subsequent revision of the paper.

¹⁴ David McCrone and Paula Surridge. 1998. 'National Identity and National Pride.' In *British and European Social Attitudes, the 15th Report* edited by Roger Jowell et al. Aldershot: Ashgate.