The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation

Edited by **Robert N. Stavins**, Harvard University

This new authoritative collection comprises previously published papers on the political economy of environmental regulation: economic analyses of the processes through which political decisions regarding environmental regulation are made, principally in the institutional context found in the United States. Despite this geographic focus, the papers contain analytical models that are methodologically of interest and/or have lessons that are relevant in other parts of the world.

In the environmental realm, questions of political economy emerge along three fundamental dimensions, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct: (1) the degrees of government activity; (2) the form of government activity; and (3) the level of government that has responsibility. The first three parts of the book deal respectively with these three fundamental dimensions of inquiry. The fourth part of the book examines the use of economic analysis in contemporary environmental policy.

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22 articles,
dating from 1975 to 2003

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'In this stimulating compendium, Stavins has assembled many important papers dealing with both positive and normative themes in environmental regulation. The political economy overlay is more than a convenient organizational device, since environmental regulation is both an economic challenge and a target of political opportunity.'

– Kenneth Shepsle, Harvard University

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